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July 10, 1941.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
state of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. Nichols. from the Select Committee to Investigate Air
Accidents, submitted the following
PRELIMINARY REPORT
[Pursuant to H. Res. 125]
FOREWORD
Your committee desires to express its appreciation to Federal, State, and
city officials; the Air Transport Association of America; officers and employees
of air carriers; and many distinguished civilian and military aviation experts for
their wholehearted cooperation and able assistance.
Your committee has regarded its task as one of paramount public concern,
calling for its best efforts to secure and submit such relevant facts to the Con-
gress as shall make it possible to enact sound legislation and promulgate regula-
tions advancing the growth and development of aviation and promoting greater
safety in the operation of all civil and military aircraft.
INTRODUCTION
As the result of a number of major accidents occurring on commercial
air lines in 1940 and 1941, involving the loss of many lives, the House of Repre-
sentatives adopted House Resolution 125, creating a select committee of five
members to make a full and complete investigation of such crashes and other air
accidents. The committee was further instructed to investigate any other mat-
ters, and to ascertain all pertinent facts in the field of commercial and civil
aviation, which it should deem necessary for the purpose of obtaining adequate
information to enable it to recommend action.
The committee which was appointed consists of Representatives Jack
Nichols, of Oklahoma, chairman; Richard M. Kleberg, of Texas; Herron
Pearson, of Tennessee; Everett M. Dirksen, of Illinois; and Carl Hinshaw, of
California.
PROCEDURE AND SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION
One of the first things which the committee did was to take an informal
course in aeronautics to familiarize itself with air-navigation facilities, meteor-
ological procedure, and other matters in order to better comprehend the field
in which it was expected to work. This instruction consisted of lectures and
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blackboard demonstrations so that the committee would have a definite and
accurate idea of the whole procedure under which civilian planes take off on
courses of directed flight, the type of weather information which is supplied
during flight, the airway facilities which are made available in the course of
flight, the type and sufficiency of the instruments which are at the disposal of
the airplane pilots, the sufficiency and adequacy of airport facilities, and the
procedure by which civilian planes are brought down to landing areas.
With this background as a supplement to the knowledge which the various
committee members had, it then became necessary to determine the procedure
to be followed in the conduct of hearings and investigations.
After a long and informal discussion the committee was unanimous in its
belief that it could best serve the cause of air safety and elicit the greatest
amount in information by conducting closed hearings.
The committee believed that this type of procedure serves a two-fold
purpose. In the first place witnesses speak more freely when conscious of the
fact that their intimate observations will not be made public. The committee
realized that it must call many employees of the Government and of the air car-
riers and that some disclosures by the witnesses might serve to prejudice their
positions if this testimony was made public. Moreover, the committee decided
to permit witnesses to testify off the record if they so desired. Other facts which
the committee had in mind were that while air commerce is growing at a
phenomenal rate, its continued growth is directly contingent upon the factor of
air safety. There was, therefore, involved in this investigation a delicate
psychological factor. The committee did not want to be guilty of damaging or
impairing public confidence in the safety of-air transportation. The committee
is convinced that the results which have been obtained and the general con-
fidence which has been manifested and expressed by those with whom it has had
contact have borne out the soundness of its procedure.
The committee also determined that it would first investigate the most
recent of the air accidents and work back in order to avail itself of all possible
testimony while it was still fresh in the minds of witnesses. Having determined
on this procedure. the committee thereupon proceeded into the field and held
hearings in various cities. Specific reports on these accidents are in preparation.
GROWTH AND PROSPECTS OF THE AIR INDUSTRY
The growth of commercial air service during the last decade has been truly
phenomenal. In 1930 there were only 417,000 air passengers for the entire
United States. By 1935 this number had more than doubled and reached 860,000.
By 1940 that number had more than tripled and there were 2,900,000 air pas-
sengers. In 1931 air line members of the Air Transport Association of America
carried passengers 119,968,577 passenger-miles, transported 1,151,348 pounds of
express and 9,643,211 pounds of mail. In 1940 they carried passengers for an
estimated 1,455,600,031 passenger-miles and transported 14,385,188 pounds of
express and 33,566,341 pounds of mail. This shows an increase in passengers
and express of better than 1,000 percent within 9 years. During these years as
new planes were made available, new schedules were approved, more aids to
navigation were provided, and airport facilities were expanded. The experiences
of the past are prophetic of the future. Air commerce is expected to grow by
leaps and bounds. It is anticipated that by 1945 there will be 11,000,000 sche-
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duled air passengers. By 1950 the number is estimated at 22,000,000. It is ob-
vious from its past growth that the aviation industry has assumed such propor-
tions as to merit the attention and thorough study of the Congress, the executive
agencies, and the country. It is manifest that no stone must be left unturned in
the interest of air safety.
COMPONENTS OF SAFETY
In a general way it may be said that four major factors enter into the
safety picture in air commerce. The first is the safety of the plane's structure
embracing its airworthiness, safety equipment, and navigation facilities, and its
capacity to carry large loads of passengers under adverse weather conditions.
The second component is the personnel factor. It relates to trained and skilled
pilots and copilots, ground personnel engaged in dispatching and supervising
flights, and the operation of all forms of ground facilities. The third component
is the adequacy of navigation facilities along the Nation's airways, which direct
the pilots in flight, keep them in close communication with the ground, and furnish
them with the latest weather reports to aid them in successfully terminating their
flight. The fourth component of safety is the adequacy of airport facilities. This
includes the size and location of airports, the length and width of its runways,
the sufficiency of approach and airport lights, the adequacy of the equipment used
in airport control towers, and the training and skill of tower operators entrusted
with the responsibility of safely directing a plane to the landing strip.
In considering these safety factors, as applied to commercial air lines, there
are numerous complications. The commercial air lines are privately owned and
operated. They are engaged as common carriers of passengers, mail, and express
on air routes established by the Civil Aeronautics Board under rules and regula-
tions made by the Board. These rules and regulations are enforced by the Civil
Aeronautics Administrator. Nearly every commercial flight originates and
terminates at municipally owned airports. The tower operators at these air-
ports, who control landings and take-offs, are city employees, subject to the
vicissitudes of local elections. Thus, we have involved in nearly every flight of
a commercial plane the complexities incident to multiple control.
Immediately surrounding nearly all airports is privately owned land upon
which buildings, structures, or other improvements may at any time be erected
at such heights as to impair or destroy the safety and usefulness of these landing
areas. Therefore, unless adequate zoning acts are passed by State legislatures
authorizing counties, cities, and towns jointly or severally to zone property, fre-
quently situated outside of the corporate limits of any city, there is an ever-present
threat to millions of dollars of Federal, State, municipal, and private funds
invested in airports throughout the Nation.
Despite these substantial investments there is an acute shortage of adequate
landing areas suited to the needs of commercial air lines and other large and
fast planes. To illustrate, within only a few months after its completion,
LaGuardia Field at New York approached the limit of its traffic load. Fre-
quently, because of congestion, commercial airplanes must fly over this port for
long periods of time before being permitted to land.
Further complications involved in the determination of many aeronautical
problems are the jealousies existing between cities and States, particularly
where the political control vests in different parties. And finally, there is the
FEDERAL
age-old problem of States' rights which arises to further confuse and delay the
sound solution of this problem.
While the committee is primarily concerned with air safety as it pertains
to scheduled flights by air carriers and their interrelationship with other air-
craft, it is not unmindful of the fact that many other elements enter into the
picture. Very few people have even the slightest appreciation of the confusion
that now exists in air traffic. There are 83,000 certified pilots in the United
States. There are 22,700 privately owned and operated planes. These planes
are not required by the Civil Aeronautics Board to file flight plans with the
Civil keronautics Administration when engaged in contact flying, and many
of them are not even equipped with one-way radios. Under certain circumstances,
these planes are extremely dangerous to commercial aircraft when they inad-
vertently, or sometimes intentionally, preempt the air space or paths of flight
designated to commercial carriers by the Civil Aeronautics Board. Court actions
are now pending against some aviators who have persisted in this practice.
Adding further confusion and danger to the air-traffic problem are thou-
sands of military and naval planes daily engaged in all manner of training,
including dive bombing and gunnery practice. In addition, there is multiple
evidence of the lack of consideration for commercial aviation in the establish-
ment by the Army and the Navy of antiaircraft and gun emplacements, which
fire projectiles up, into, and through designated airways used by commercial
airlines. Then there are thousands of planes being manufactured in every
section of the United States, which must first be flight tested and then ferried
to Canada and elsewhere for delivery. These planes are being flown across
the United States in ever-increasing numbers. They must land from time to
time at our principal airports. It follows that in the interest of safety the
whole field of air navigation requires the closest scrutiny for the purpose of
developing a thoroughly comprehensive pattern of air conduct.
FATAL AND SERIOUS ACCIDENTS IN AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS
IN 1940 AND 1941
In 1940 and 1941 there were nine serious accidents involving commercial
airlines, which are tabulated as follows :
Date Place Operator Fatal Serious
Jan. 12. 1940 Moline. Ill .... United Air Lines.................. .......... .
Aug. 31, 1940 Lovettsville, Va.- Pennsylvania Central Airlines_... 25........2
Nov. 4. 1940 Centerville. Utah... United Air Lines .................. ... 10 ............
Dec. 4. 1940 Chicago. Ill ........... do............................ 10 6
Dec. 11. 1940 St. Louis. Mo.... American Airlines. Inc.---........
Jan. 23. 1941 -do .... Transcontinental & Wstn. Airlines.. 2 5Feb. 26. 1941 Atlanta, Ga .-...- - Eastern Air Lines_. ... . 8 6Apr. 3. 1941 Verota. a ........... E t A r in............................ .................... 8 6
Apr. 16. 1941 Charleston. W. Va.- Pennsylvania Central Airlines__...... .. 2
Total . 55 29
POTENTIALLY SERIOUS ACCIDENTS TO AIR CARRIERS IN 1940 AND 1941
Other potentially serious accidents to commercial airlines in 1940 and 1941
which caused no fatalities are as follows:
December 11, 1940, St. Louis, Mo., American Airlines.
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December 14, 1940, Bismarck, N. Dak., Northwest Airlines.
December 28, 1940, Miami, Fla., Pan-American Airways.
January 4, 1941, Birmingham, Ala., Delta Air Corporation.
January 5, 1941, near Newhall, Calif., United Air Lines.
February 7, 1941, Bellefonte, Pa., All American, Inc.
February 9, 1941, Duluth, Minn., Northwest Airlines.
February 26, 1941, Kansas City, Mo., Transcontinental & Western Airlines.
March 10, 1941, Cincinnati, Ohio, American Airlines.
April 3, 1941, Vero Beach, Fla., Eastern Air Lines.
April 16, 1941, Charleston, W. Va., Pennsylvania-Central.
April 23, 1941, El Paso, Tex., Continental Air Lines.
June 1, 1941. Wichita, Kans., Transcontinental & Western Airlines and
Braniff (collision on the ground).
June 3, 1941, Joliet, Ill., Chicago and Southern.
June 5, 1941, Tampa, Fla., Eastern Air Lines.
June 11, 1941, Sioux City, Iowa, Mid-Continent Airlines.
June 21, 1941, Forth Worth, Tex., American Airlines.
The above accidents are sometimes called "miracle accidents." Your com-
mittee believes that the investigation of nonfatal accidents is often more pro-
ductive than an investigation of more serious crashes causing fatalities. This is
particularly true where no member of the crew survives to tell at least some
part of the story.
In other than air carrier flying, there were 55 collisions with utility wires
in 1940 compared with 53 for the preceding year; 2 of these accidents resulted
in fatalities and 1 of them in serious injury; 5 of the airplanes were completely
demolished and 39 received major damage. This is only one illustration, of the
many received in evidence by the committee, which indicates the necessity of
zoning laws requiring the removal of existing hazards and forbidding the
building of new obstructions around airports.
FATAL ACCIDENTS IN THE ARMY AIR CORPS FOR 1940 AND 1941
Indicative of the increased military activities of our country, the committee
is advised by the War Department that during the fiscal year of 1939-40 there
were 41 fatal accidents in the United States Army Air Corps, while in the fiscal
year of 1940-41 there were 121 fatal accidents.
INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE COMMITEE
The select committee has thus far conducted the following investigations:
1. American Airlines accident at Cincinnati, Ohio, which occurred on
March 10, 1941.
2. Eastern Air Lines accident on February 26, 1941, at Atlanta, Ga.
3. Eastern Air Lines accident on April 3, 1941, at Vero Beach, Fla.
4. Pennsylvania-Central Airlines accident at Charleston, W. Va., April 17,
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5. Transcontinental & Western Airlines accident at St. Louis, Mo.,
January 23, 1941.
6. American Airlines accident at St. Louis, Mo., on December 11, 1940.
7. United Airlines accident, Chicago, Ill., December 4, 1940.
8. Chicago & Southern Airlines accident on June 3, 1941, at Joliet, Ill.
9. United Airlines accident near Centerville, Utah, November 4, 1940.
10. Transcontinental & Western Airlines and Braniff collision on the ground
at Wichita, Kans., June 1, 1941.
11. Eastern Air Lines accident at Tampa, Fla., June 5, 1941.
12. Mid-Continent Airlines accident at Sioux City, Iowa, June 11, 1941.
13. American Airlines accident near Forth Worth, Tex., June 21, 1941.
Your committee will in due course make specific findings as to the cause
or causes of these accidents.
ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF AIR ACCIDENTS
Generally speaking, adverse weather is a major contributing factor in the
more disastrous air crashes. The Congress cannot change the weather, but it
can provide for better observations and more accurate forecasts of weather
through appropriations for research work and for a larger and better trained
weather personnel. Congress can provide for better facilities to meet the hazards
of darkness and adverse weather and for continued research to overcome the
hazards of ice.
The second cause of many crashes is inadequate lighting of airports and
their approaches. Minimum standards must be legislated by the Congress with
respect to airport lighting, for the majority of commercial air-line accidents
resulting in fatalities occur at night and under adverse weather conditions.
Authority should be granted to the Civil Aeronautics Administrator to license
airports and to determine the character of the -interstate operations which may
be carried on at such airports.
The third cause of accidents is on a parity with the second, but is subject
only indirectly to remedial action by the Congress, and that is, the inherent
defects in, obstructions upon, and hazards about, the existing airports. Your
committee believe that the only direct action the Congress can take on these
matters is to authorize the licensing and grading of airports by the Civil
Aeronautics Administrator, and thereby limit the use of many airports to day-
light and good weather operations until such time as the cities and States in
which they are situated shall take the necessary steps to insure the safety of
interstate commerce. This will require the enactment by many State legis-
latures of enabling acts empowering cities and other subdivisions of government
to zone all approaches to their airports.
The fourth cause, difficult to classify because it enters into almost every
major accident, to a greater or lesser degree, is human error. This applies
alike to ground and flying personnel. With but a few exceptions, in the accidents
that this committee has investigated, the accident occurred as a result of a
contribution of human error. And in nearly every case, had one less error been
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committed, the accident probably could have been prevented. The purpose of
legislation which has been and will be proposed by this committee is to provide
such regulations and facilities as will reduce human errors to the lowest pos-
sible minimum.
CONTRIBUTING CAUSES FOR OTHER ACCIDENTS
Other contributing causes of accidents have been found to be defects in
flying equipment, such as windshield wipers and de-icers; the want of an ade-
quate number of trained weather observers and forecasters; inadequate and
defective communications, and the want of trained control tower operators.
From the investigations your committee has conducted so far, we have
unanimously arrived at the conclusion that bad weather, icing, poor lights, defec-
tive airports, hazardous obstructions on and about airports, loose organization,
faulty communications, and human error have contributed jointly and severally
to cause every serious accident which has occurred in the past 2 years. We have
found no evidence of sabotage in any of these accidents.
RECOMMENDATIONS
At this time your committee recommend:
1. That the Government of the United States assume jurisdiction of all
navigable air space over the United States, its Territories and possessions.
2. Creation of some authority in whom will be vested c6ntrol of all traffic
moving through the navigable air space and over all missiles projecting into the
navigable air space.
3. The enactment by the Congress of legislation, to give full force and
effect to recommendations 1 and 2 above, by authorizing the President of the
United States to appoint a Coordinator of Air (or the creation of some other
agency of government), who shall be authorized to control and to apportion the
navigable air space over the United States, its Territories and possessions to
military and other aircraft, and to such other activities as must be carried
on through navigable air space.
4. The enactment of legislation establishing and setting up minimum
requirements for lighting of airports and other landing areas to be enforced
by the Civil Aeronautics Administrator.
5. The enactment of legislation empowering the Administrator to detail
annually not to exceed 25 employees of the Civil Aeronautics Administration to
engage in technical or professional duties for training at Government expense.
6. The enactment of legislation to provide for the training of control tower
operators.
7. The committee recommends the serious consideration of legislation
which would place at least one man on every shift in all airport control towers
under the supervision of the Airway Traffic Control Section of the Civil Aero-
nautics Administration so that Federal air traffic control would extend from
ramp to ramp with respect to commercial air lines.
The above recommendations should not be construed to mean that it is the
opinion of the committee that all the problems of air safety would be solved by
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such legislative enactments. Your committee would rather have deferred mak-
ing any recommendations until it had completed its investigation, but the present
national emergency requires action and not prolonged consideration of these
imperative needs. Your committee hereafter will have further recommendations





JuLy 9, 1941. HFRRoN PEARSON.
